๐ฎ EU Parliament Monitor โ Future Threat Model
๐ก๏ธ Evolving Threat Landscape & Planned Security Controls
๐ Future Architecture Threats โข AI/LLM Security โข Advanced Democratic Protection
๐ Document Owner: CEO | ๐ Version: 2.0 | ๐
Last Updated:
2026-03-19 (UTC)
๐ Review Cycle: Quarterly | โฐ Next Review: 2026-06-19
๐ท๏ธ Classification: Public (Open Civic Transparency Platform)
๐ Architecture Documentation Map
Category
Document
Description
Status
๐๏ธ Architecture
ARCHITECTURE.md
C4 model system architecture
โ
Current
๐ Data Model
DATA_MODEL.md
Entity relationships and data flow
โ
Current
๐ Flowchart
FLOWCHART.md
Process workflows and data flows
โ
Current
๐ State Diagram
STATEDIAGRAM.md
System state transitions
โ
Current
๐ง Mind Map
MINDMAP.md
Conceptual system relationships
โ
Current
๐ผ SWOT
SWOT.md
Strategic analysis
โ
Current
๐ก๏ธ Security
SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md
Security controls and architecture
โ
Current
๐ฏ Threats
THREAT_MODEL.md
Current threat landscape (20 threats)
โ
Current
๐ฎ Future Threats
FUTURE_THREAT_MODEL.md
This document โ Future threat analysis
๐ Planning
๐ Future Architecture
FUTURE_ARCHITECTURE.md
Architectural evolution roadmap
๐ Planning
๐ Future Security
FUTURE_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md
Planned security enhancements
๐ Planning
๐ฏ Purpose & Scope
This document identifies emerging threats and planned security controls for the EU Parliament Monitor as it evolves from a static site generator into an advanced European Parliament intelligence platform. It complements the current THREAT_MODEL.md with forward-looking analysis of threats that will materialize as new capabilities are added.
๐ Transparency Commitment
As an open-source European Parliament monitoring platform, this future threat model is published publicly to:
๐ Demonstrate Proactive Security : Show commitment to anticipating threats before they materialize
๐ Enable Community Review : Allow security researchers to review planned defenses
๐๏ธ Democratic Accountability : Ensure transparency in protecting democratic information systems
๐ค Build Trust : Provide evidence of systematic security planning to stakeholders
๐ Framework Integration
This future threat model follows the Hack23 ISMS Threat Modeling Policy framework:
STRIDE Framework : Threat categorization per future system component
MITRE ATT&CK : Technique mapping for emerging attack vectors
ENISA Threat Landscape : EU-specific threat intelligence integration
OWASP LLM Top 10 : AI/LLM-specific threat classification
CIA Triad : Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability impact analysis
๐ Reference Documents
๐ Planned Architecture Evolution
๐ Architecture Transition Timeline
%%{ init: { 'theme': 'base', 'themeVariables': { 'primaryColor': '#e3f2fd', 'primaryTextColor': '#0d47a1', 'lineColor': '#1976d2' } } }%% timeline title EU Parliament Monitor Architecture Evolution section Current (2026 H1) Static Site Generator : Node.js + EP MCP Server GitHub Pages : CDN-delivered static HTML 14 Languages : Template-based generation section Phase 2 (2026 H2) AI Content Pipeline : LLM-enhanced news generation Confidence Scoring : Automated fact-checking Enhanced Monitoring : Real-time EP data validation section Phase 3 (2027) Real-Time Dashboard : Dynamic parliamentary analytics API Gateway : Public API for EP data access Community Features : User feedback and reporting section Phase 4 (2028+) Predictive Analytics : AI-powered political forecasting Multi-Parliament : Extended to national parliaments Federation : Decentralized transparency network
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๐ Attack Surface Evolution
flowchart LR subgraph "Current Attack Surface" direction TB C1[๐ Static HTML] --- C2[๐ EP MCP Client] C2 --- C3[โ๏ธ GitHub Actions] C3 --- C4[๐ฆ npm Dependencies] end subgraph "Phase 2 Attack Surface" direction TB P2_1[๐ค LLM Pipeline] --- P2_2[๐ Confidence Scoring] P2_2 --- P2_3[๐ Fact Checking] P2_3 --- P2_4[๐ก Enhanced Monitoring] end subgraph "Phase 3 Attack Surface" direction TB P3_1[๐ API Gateway] --- P3_2[๐ฅ User Accounts] P3_2 --- P3_3[๐ฌ Community Features] P3_3 --- P3_4[๐ Real-Time Dashboard] end subgraph "Phase 4 Attack Surface" direction TB P4_1[๐ Multi-Parliament] --- P4_2[๐ Federation Protocol] P4_2 --- P4_3[๐ง Predictive AI] P4_3 --- P4_4[๐ Analytics Engine] end C4 -.->|"+8-12 threats"| P2_1 P2_4 -.->|"+10-15 threats"| P3_1 P3_4 -.->|"+5-8 threats"| P4_1 style C1 fill:#e8f5e9 style P2_1 fill:#fff4e1 style P3_1 fill:#ffe1e1 style P4_1 fill:#f3e5f5
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๐ Future Critical Assets & Protection Goals
๐๏ธ Asset-Centric Analysis for Future Architecture
Asset
Phase
CIA Classification
Protection Priority
AI/LLM Models
Phase 2
C:Low, I:Critical, A:High
Model integrity, provenance verification
API Keys & OAuth Tokens
Phase 3
C:High, I:High, A:Medium
Secret management, rotation policies
User Account Data
Phase 3
C:High (GDPR), I:High, A:Medium
Privacy by design, encryption at rest
Community Content
Phase 3
C:Public, I:High, A:Medium
Content integrity, moderation
Federation Credentials
Phase 4
C:Critical, I:Critical, A:High
Mutual TLS, certificate management
Predictive Models
Phase 4
C:Medium, I:Critical, A:Medium
Model integrity, bias prevention
Cross-Parliament Data
Phase 4
C:Low, I:Critical, A:High
Data reconciliation, source verification
๐ Crown Jewel Analysis (Future State)
Crown Jewel
Threat Category
Worst-Case Impact
Protection Strategy
Democratic Content Integrity
Data Manipulation
Public misinformation from trusted source
Multi-layer validation, confidence scoring, human review
User Privacy (GDPR)
Data Breach
Regulatory fines, reputation damage
Privacy by design, data minimization, encryption
AI Model Integrity
Model Poisoning
Systematically biased political content
Model provenance, training data audit, bias detection
Federation Trust
Protocol Abuse
Cross-platform trust compromise
Mutual TLS, zero-trust architecture, audit logging
๐ Future Threat Categories
๐ค FT-001: AI/LLM Content Generation Threats
Applies to: Phase 2 (AI Content Pipeline)
Threat
Description
STRIDE
MITRE ATT&CK
Likelihood
Impact
Mitigation Strategy
LLM Prompt Injection
Adversarial EP data crafted to manipulate LLM output during news generation
Tampering
T1059
Medium
High
Input sanitization, prompt engineering guardrails, output validation
LLM Hallucination
AI generates plausible but incorrect parliamentary information
Tampering
N/A
High
High
Confidence scoring, human-in-the-loop for <0.85 confidence, cross-reference validation
Model Poisoning
Training data manipulation to bias AI-generated content
Tampering
T1565
Low
Critical
Model provenance verification, training data audit, bias detection
LLM Data Leakage
AI model inadvertently exposing sensitive information in generated content
Information Disclosure
T1530
Low
Medium
Output filtering, PII detection, content review pipeline
Adversarial Prompt via EP Data
Crafted parliamentary text exploiting LLM instruction-following
Tampering
T1059.006
Medium
High
Input boundary enforcement, system prompt hardening
Model Supply Chain Attack
Compromised LLM model weights or framework dependency
Tampering
T1195
Low
Critical
Model checksums, signed artifacts, provenance verification
OWASP LLM Top 10 Alignment:
OWASP LLM ID
Threat
EU Parliament Monitor Relevance
Planned Control
LLM01
Prompt Injection
EP data used as LLM input could contain injection vectors
Input sanitization, prompt hardening
LLM02
Insecure Output Handling
Generated HTML could contain unsafe content from LLM
Output validation, CSP, auto-escaping
LLM04
Model Denial of Service
Excessive EP data could overwhelm LLM processing
Rate limiting, input size caps, timeout enforcement
LLM05
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
LLM model or framework dependencies could be compromised
Model provenance, dependency scanning
LLM06
Sensitive Information Disclosure
LLM might include sensitive patterns from training data
Output filtering, content review
LLM09
Overreliance
Trusting LLM output without verification
Confidence scoring, human review queue
๐ FT-002: API Gateway & Dynamic Content Threats
Applies to: Phase 3 (Real-Time Dashboard)
Threat
Description
STRIDE
MITRE ATT&CK
Likelihood
Impact
Mitigation Strategy
API Abuse
Rate limiting bypass, credential stuffing on API endpoints
Denial of Service
T1110
Medium
Medium
OAuth2/API keys, rate limiting, WAF rules
Server-Side Request Forgery
API gateway exploited to access internal resources
Elevation of Privilege
T1190
Low
High
Strict allowlisting, network segmentation
Real-Time Data Poisoning
Malicious data injected into live dashboard feeds
Tampering
T1565
Low
High
Schema validation, anomaly detection, data signing
Session Hijacking
Authenticated user sessions compromised
Spoofing
T1539
Low
Medium
Secure session management, HTTPS-only, SameSite cookies
GraphQL Injection
Malicious queries exploiting GraphQL endpoint complexity
Tampering
T1190
Medium
Medium
Query depth limiting, complexity analysis, rate limiting
WebSocket Hijacking
Real-time data stream interception or manipulation
Spoofing
T1557
Low
High
WSS (TLS), origin validation, message authentication
Applies to: Phase 3 (Community Features)
Threat
Description
STRIDE
MITRE ATT&CK
Likelihood
Impact
Mitigation Strategy
User-Generated Content Abuse
Spam, disinformation, or political manipulation via feedback system
Tampering
T1491
High
Medium
Content moderation, anti-spam filters, reporting mechanism
GDPR Data Breach
User personal data exposure from community features
Information Disclosure
T1530
Low
Critical
Privacy by design, data minimization, encryption at rest
Account Takeover
Community user accounts compromised for manipulation
Spoofing
T1078
Medium
Medium
MFA, rate limiting, anomaly detection
Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior
Bot networks manipulating community sentiment
Repudiation
T1583
Medium
High
Bot detection, behavioral analysis, rate limiting
Cross-Site Scripting (Stored)
User-submitted content containing XSS payloads
Tampering
T1189
Medium
High
Input sanitization, CSP, output encoding
๐ FT-004: Multi-Parliament Federation Threats
Applies to: Phase 4 (Multi-Parliament)
Threat
Description
STRIDE
MITRE ATT&CK
Likelihood
Impact
Mitigation Strategy
Cross-Parliament Data Integrity
Inconsistent data between EU and national parliament sources
Tampering
T1565
Medium
Medium
Data reconciliation, source verification, integrity checksums
Federation Protocol Abuse
Exploiting inter-system communication for unauthorized data access
Elevation of Privilege
T1071
Low
High
Mutual TLS, API authentication, protocol validation
Jurisdiction Conflict
Different privacy laws (GDPR vs. national) creating compliance gaps
N/A
N/A
Medium
Medium
Legal review per jurisdiction, data classification, consent management
Supply Chain via Federation Partner
Compromised national parliament data source injecting malicious data
Tampering
T1195.002
Low
Critical
Source validation, data integrity checks, anomaly detection
DNS Hijacking of Federation Endpoints
Redirecting federation traffic to attacker-controlled servers
Spoofing
T1584.002
Low
High
Certificate pinning, DNSSEC, mutual TLS
๐๏ธ MITRE ATT&CK Future Coverage Analysis
๐ ATT&CK Tactics for Emerging Attack Surface
Tactic
Current Coverage
Phase 2 (AI)
Phase 3 (API)
Phase 4 (Federation)
Initial Access
โ
Supply chain, dependency
๐ฎ Model poisoning
๐ฎ API exploitation, credential stuffing
๐ฎ Federation endpoint abuse
Execution
โ
GitHub Actions
๐ฎ Prompt injection, LLM manipulation
๐ฎ GraphQL injection
๐ฎ Cross-parliament code execution
Persistence
โ
Repository compromise
๐ฎ Backdoored models
๐ฎ Account persistence, session fixation
๐ฎ Federation trust abuse
Privilege Escalation
โ
Token scope abuse
๐ฎ Model authority escalation
๐ฎ OAuth scope escalation
๐ฎ Cross-jurisdiction privilege
Defense Evasion
โ
SHA pinning bypass
๐ฎ Adversarial input evasion
๐ฎ WAF bypass
๐ฎ Cross-border evasion
Credential Access
โ
Secret exposure
๐ฎ API key extraction from LLM
๐ฎ OAuth token theft
๐ฎ mTLS certificate theft
Collection
โ
EP data access
๐ฎ Training data extraction
๐ฎ User data scraping
๐ฎ Cross-parliament data harvest
Impact
โ
Content manipulation
๐ฎ Systematic bias injection
๐ฎ Service disruption, data manipulation
๐ฎ Democratic process manipulation
๐ณ Future Attack Trees
graph TD ROOT[๐ฏ Compromise Democratic<br/>Content Integrity] --> AI[๐ค AI Pipeline Attack] ROOT --> API[๐ API/Dashboard Attack] ROOT --> FED[๐ Federation Attack] ROOT --> SOCIAL[๐ฅ Social Engineering] AI --> AI1[Prompt Injection<br/>via EP Data] AI --> AI2[Model Poisoning<br/>via Training Data] AI --> AI3[Hallucination<br/>Exploitation] API --> API1[GraphQL<br/>Injection] API --> API2[Real-Time Data<br/>Poisoning] API --> API3[Session<br/>Hijacking] FED --> FED1[Federation<br/>Protocol Abuse] FED --> FED2[Compromised<br/>Partner Data] FED --> FED3[Jurisdiction<br/>Exploitation] SOCIAL --> SOC1[Coordinated<br/>Inauthentic Behavior] SOCIAL --> SOC2[Insider<br/>Threat] style ROOT fill:#ff6b6b,color:#fff style AI fill:#fff4e1 style API fill:#e1f5ff style FED fill:#f3e5f5 style SOCIAL fill:#ffe1e1
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๐ฅ Future Threat Agent Evolution
๐ Evolving Threat Actor Landscape
Agent Type
Current Risk
Phase 2 Risk
Phase 3 Risk
Phase 4 Risk
Evolution Driver
๐๏ธ Nation-State Actors
Medium
High
High
Critical
AI manipulation tools, geopolitical interest in EU data
๐ฐ Cybercriminals
Low
Medium
High
High
API monetization creates financial targets
๐ญ Hacktivists
Medium
Medium
High
High
Community features enable social manipulation
๐ค Malicious Insiders
Low
Medium
Medium
High
Expanded team, federation partners
๐ง Accidental Insiders
Medium
High
High
High
AI complexity increases error probability
๐ค AI-Powered Attackers
Low
High
High
Critical
Automated adversarial content generation
๐ฏ Future Threat Agent Capabilities
Capability
2026 (Current)
2027 (Phase 3)
2028+ (Phase 4)
Adversarial ML
Emerging
Mainstream
Advanced
Automated Content Manipulation
Basic
Sophisticated
AI-native
Cross-Platform Attacks
Limited
Moderate
Advanced (federation)
Supply Chain Sophistication
Known patterns
AI model supply chain
Federation supply chain
Democratic Process Targeting
Election periods
Continuous influence
Systemic manipulation
๐ Future Risk Assessment
๐ฏ Risk Matrix for Future Threats
%%{ init: { 'theme': 'base', 'themeVariables': { 'primaryColor': '#fff', 'primaryTextColor': '#000', 'lineColor': '#333' } } }%% quadrantChart title ๐ฎ Future Threat Risk Assessment x-axis Low Likelihood --> High Likelihood y-axis Low Impact --> High Impact quadrant-1 Monitor & Prepare quadrant-2 Immediate Planning Required quadrant-3 Accept Risk quadrant-4 Design Controls Now "๐ค LLM Hallucination": [0.75, 0.70] "๐ค Prompt Injection": [0.55, 0.65] "๐ค Model Poisoning": [0.30, 0.85] "๐ API Abuse": [0.60, 0.50] "๐ SSRF": [0.35, 0.70] "๐ฅ Content Abuse": [0.70, 0.45] "๐ฅ GDPR Breach": [0.30, 0.80] "๐ Data Integrity": [0.55, 0.55] "๐ Federation Abuse": [0.30, 0.65]
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๐ Quantitative Risk Scoring (Future Threats)
Threat ID
Threat
Likelihood (1-5)
Impact (1-5)
Risk Score
Priority
FT-001a
LLM Prompt Injection
3
4
12
๐ด High
FT-001b
LLM Hallucination
4
4
16
๐ด Critical
FT-001c
Model Poisoning
2
5
10
๐ด High
FT-001d
LLM Data Leakage
2
3
6
๐ก Medium
FT-001e
Adversarial Prompt
3
4
12
๐ด High
FT-001f
Model Supply Chain
2
5
10
๐ด High
FT-002a
API Abuse
3
3
9
๐ก Medium
FT-002b
SSRF
2
4
8
๐ก Medium
FT-002c
Data Poisoning
2
4
8
๐ก Medium
FT-002d
Session Hijacking
2
3
6
๐ก Medium
FT-003a
Content Abuse
4
3
12
๐ด High
FT-003b
GDPR Breach
2
5
10
๐ด High
FT-003c
Account Takeover
3
3
9
๐ก Medium
FT-004a
Cross-Parliament Integrity
3
3
9
๐ก Medium
FT-004b
Federation Protocol Abuse
2
4
8
๐ก Medium
๐ Threat Evolution Timeline
Phase
New Attack Surface
Threat Count Increase
Key New Controls Required
Current
Static site + EP MCP
20 threats (baseline)
Schema validation, CSP, SAST
Phase 2
+ AI/LLM pipeline
+8-12 threats (LLM-specific)
Confidence scoring, output validation, prompt hardening
Phase 3
+ API gateway, users
+10-15 threats (API/user)
WAF, OAuth2, rate limiting, session management
Phase 4
+ Multi-parliament federation
+5-8 threats (federation)
Mutual TLS, data reconciliation, jurisdiction management
๐ฏ Scenario-Centric Future Threat Analysis
๐ญ Misuse Cases
Scenario: A nation-state actor identifies that EU Parliament Monitor uses LLM-generated content. They craft adversarial European Parliament documents designed to trigger specific LLM outputs, injecting subtle political bias into generated news articles across all 14 languages.
Attack Path:
Attacker submits amendments to EP documents with adversarial text patterns
EP MCP Server fetches legitimate EP data containing adversarial content
LLM processes the data and generates subtly biased news articles
Biased content published across 14 languages, amplifying disinformation
Impact: Medium-High โ Undermines democratic transparency platform credibility
Mitigation: Confidence scoring, cross-reference validation, multi-source fact-checking, human review queue for political content
Scenario: A coordinated group creates fake user accounts to systematically upvote/downvote community assessments of MEP activities, creating artificial consensus around political positions.
Attack Path:
Attacker registers multiple accounts using disposable email services
Bot network systematically rates/reviews MEP activities
Artificial consensus distorts public perception via platform
Impact: High โ Platform becomes tool for political manipulation rather than transparency
Mitigation: Bot detection, behavioral analysis, rate limiting per account, proof-of-work for registration, anomaly detection on voting patterns
๐ค What-If Analysis
What-If Scenario
Probability
Impact
Response Strategy
What if EP Open Data API introduces authentication?
Medium
High
Implement OAuth2 client, update MCP server, credential rotation
What if a major LLM provider has a security breach?
Low
Critical
Model isolation, fallback to template-based generation, incident response
What if EU AI Act mandates content labeling?
High
Medium
Implement AI content disclosure, transparency watermarking
What if a federation partner is compromised?
Low
High
Mutual TLS revocation, data quarantine, partner isolation
What if coordinated attack targets during EU elections?
Medium
Critical
Election security protocols, enhanced monitoring, manual override
๐ก๏ธ Planned Security Controls
Phase 2: AI Content Pipeline Security
Control
Purpose
Priority
Timeline
STRIDE Mitigation
Confidence Scoring System
Score 0.0-1.0 for each generated article; human review if <0.85
P1
Q3 2026
Tampering
LLM Output Validation
Automated fact-checking against official EP data sources
P1
Q3 2026
Tampering
Prompt Injection Detection
Input sanitization for EP data before LLM processing
P1
Q3 2026
Tampering
Content Integrity Pipeline
Cross-reference generated content with source EP data
P2
Q4 2026
Tampering, Repudiation
AI Bias Detection
Automated political neutrality checking across 14 languages
P2
Q4 2026
Tampering
Model Provenance Verification
Signed model artifacts, checksum validation
P1
Q3 2026
Tampering
Control
Purpose
Priority
Timeline
STRIDE Mitigation
API Gateway with WAF
Rate limiting, authentication, request validation
P1
Q1 2027
DoS, Tampering
OAuth2/OIDC Authentication
Secure user authentication for community features
P1
Q1 2027
Spoofing
Content Moderation System
Anti-spam, disinformation detection, reporting
P1
Q2 2027
Tampering, Repudiation
GDPR Compliance Layer
Privacy by design, data minimization, consent management
P1
Q1 2027
Information Disclosure
Real-Time Anomaly Detection
Monitor live data feeds for integrity violations
P2
Q2 2027
Tampering
GraphQL Query Complexity Limiting
Prevent denial-of-service via complex queries
P1
Q1 2027
DoS
Phase 4: Federation Security
Control
Purpose
Priority
Timeline
STRIDE Mitigation
Mutual TLS for Federation
Secure inter-parliament communication
P1
2028
Spoofing, Tampering
Data Reconciliation Engine
Cross-validate data between parliament sources
P1
2028
Tampering
Jurisdiction Compliance Engine
Automated GDPR/national law compliance checking
P2
2028
Information Disclosure
Zero-Trust Federation Architecture
Never trust, always verify partner data
P1
2028
Spoofing, Elevation of Privilege
Federation Audit Trail
Immutable logging of all cross-parliament operations
P1
2028
Repudiation
๐ Future Compliance Framework Mapping
๐ Emerging Regulatory Landscape
Regulation
Effective Date
Impact on EP Monitor
Required Controls
EU AI Act
2026-2027
AI content generation transparency requirements
AI content labeling, risk assessment, bias detection
EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA)
2027
Software security requirements for open-source
SBOM, vulnerability disclosure, security updates
NIS2 Directive
Already effective
Critical infrastructure security (if classified)
Incident reporting, risk management, supply chain security
GDPR
Already effective
User data protection for community features
Privacy by design, DPO, DPIA, consent management
EU Data Act
2025-2026
Data sharing and interoperability requirements
Data portability, fair access, interoperability standards
๐๏ธ Future ISO 27001:2022 Control Mapping
Control
Phase 2 Relevance
Phase 3 Relevance
Phase 4 Relevance
A.5.23 Cloud Security
LLM API security
API gateway cloud deployment
Federation cloud architecture
A.8.9 Configuration Management
AI pipeline config
API & user config
Federation config management
A.8.12 Data Leakage Prevention
LLM output filtering
User data protection
Cross-border data controls
A.8.25 Secure Development
AI pipeline testing
API security testing
Federation protocol testing
A.8.28 Secure Coding
Prompt engineering
API input validation
Protocol implementation
๐ Continuous Threat Landscape Monitoring
๐ก Emerging Threat Indicators
The following developments should trigger a threat model update:
Indicator
Trigger Action
Review Priority
New LLM vulnerability class discovered
Update OWASP LLM Top 10 alignment
๐ด High
EP API major version change
Re-assess data integrity controls
๐ด High
European Parliament election period
Activate election security protocols
๐ด High
New ENISA Threat Landscape published
Update ENISA alignment section
๐ก Medium
GitHub Actions security advisory
Review CI/CD security controls
๐ก Medium
New EU regulation (AI Act, CRA update)
Update compliance mapping
๐ก Medium
National parliament data source added
Expand threat model scope
๐ก Medium
Major LLM provider breach or incident
Review AI pipeline security controls
๐ด High
Federation partner security incident
Activate partner isolation protocols
๐ด High
๐
Future Assessment Lifecycle
Assessment Type
Frequency
Trigger
Scope
Quarterly Review
Every 3 months
Scheduled
Full threat landscape review
Phase Transition Assessment
Per architecture phase
Phase completion
New attack surface analysis
Incident-Driven Assessment
As needed
Security incident
Affected threat categories
Regulatory Update Assessment
As needed
New regulation
Compliance impact analysis
ENISA-Triggered Review
Annually
ENISA report publication
EU threat landscape alignment
๐ฏ Future Threat Modeling Maturity
๐ Planned Maturity Progression
Level
Phase
Capabilities
Evidence
๐ข Level 2: Repeatable
Current
Structured STRIDE analysis, MITRE ATT&CK mapping
THREAT_MODEL.md v2.0
๐ก Level 3: Defined
Phase 2
AI-specific threat modeling, automated threat detection
OWASP LLM integration, CI/CD security gates
๐ Level 4: Managed
Phase 3
Quantitative risk assessment, threat intelligence feeds
Real-time monitoring, SIEM integration
๐ด Level 5: Optimized
Phase 4
Predictive threat analysis, automated response
AI-driven threat detection, self-healing controls
Approval and Review
Role
Name
Date
Signature
Security Architect
Security Team
2026-03-19
Approved
Product Owner
Product Team
2026-03-19
Approved
CEO / CISO
CEO
2026-03-19
Approved
๐ Change Log
Version
Date
Author
Changes
1.0
2026-02-26
Security Team
Initial future threat model document
- AI/LLM threat analysis (OWASP LLM Top 10 alignment)
- API gateway and dynamic content threats
- Community feature threat analysis
- Multi-parliament federation threats
- Planned security controls roadmap (Phase 2-4)
- Emerging threat indicator monitoring plan
2.0
2026-03-19
Security Team
Major expansion per ISMS Threat Modeling Policy
- Added architecture documentation map
- Added STRIDE categorization to all threats
- Added MITRE ATT&CK future coverage analysis
- Added future attack trees with Mermaid diagrams
- Added threat agent evolution analysis
- Added quantitative risk scoring
- Added scenario-centric analysis (misuse cases)
- Added what-if analysis
- Added future compliance framework mapping
- Added crown jewel analysis for future state
- Added threat modeling maturity progression
- Added attack surface evolution diagram
๐ Document Control:
โ
Approved by: James Pether Sรถrling, CEO - Hack23 AB
๐ค Distribution: Public
๐ท๏ธ Classification:
This future threat model anticipates the evolving threat landscape for the EU Parliament Monitor as it advances from a static site generator to a comprehensive European Parliament intelligence platform. It demonstrates Hack23 AB's commitment to proactive security through forward-looking threat analysis aligned with the Hack23 ISMS Threat Modeling Policy .