EU Parliament Monitor โ€” API Documentation - v0.8.13
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    ๐Ÿ”ฎ EU Parliament Monitor โ€” Future Threat Model

    ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Evolving Threat Landscape & Planned Security Controls
    ๐Ÿ” Future Architecture Threats โ€ข AI/LLM Security โ€ข Advanced Democratic Protection

    Owner Version Effective Date Review Cycle OpenSSF Best Practices

    ๐Ÿ“‹ Document Owner: CEO | ๐Ÿ“„ Version: 2.0 | ๐Ÿ“… Last Updated: 2026-03-19 (UTC)
    ๐Ÿ”„ Review Cycle: Quarterly | โฐ Next Review: 2026-06-19
    ๐Ÿท๏ธ Classification: Public (Open Civic Transparency Platform)


    Category Document Description Status
    ๐Ÿ›๏ธ Architecture ARCHITECTURE.md C4 model system architecture โœ… Current
    ๐Ÿ“Š Data Model DATA_MODEL.md Entity relationships and data flow โœ… Current
    ๐Ÿ”„ Flowchart FLOWCHART.md Process workflows and data flows โœ… Current
    ๐Ÿ“ˆ State Diagram STATEDIAGRAM.md System state transitions โœ… Current
    ๐Ÿง  Mind Map MINDMAP.md Conceptual system relationships โœ… Current
    ๐Ÿ’ผ SWOT SWOT.md Strategic analysis โœ… Current
    ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Security SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md Security controls and architecture โœ… Current
    ๐ŸŽฏ Threats THREAT_MODEL.md Current threat landscape (20 threats) โœ… Current
    ๐Ÿ”ฎ Future Threats FUTURE_THREAT_MODEL.md This document โ€” Future threat analysis ๐Ÿ“‹ Planning
    ๐Ÿš€ Future Architecture FUTURE_ARCHITECTURE.md Architectural evolution roadmap ๐Ÿ“‹ Planning
    ๐Ÿš€ Future Security FUTURE_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md Planned security enhancements ๐Ÿ“‹ Planning

    This document identifies emerging threats and planned security controls for the EU Parliament Monitor as it evolves from a static site generator into an advanced European Parliament intelligence platform. It complements the current THREAT_MODEL.md with forward-looking analysis of threats that will materialize as new capabilities are added.

    As an open-source European Parliament monitoring platform, this future threat model is published publicly to:

    • ๐Ÿ” Demonstrate Proactive Security: Show commitment to anticipating threats before they materialize
    • ๐Ÿ“‹ Enable Community Review: Allow security researchers to review planned defenses
    • ๐Ÿ›๏ธ Democratic Accountability: Ensure transparency in protecting democratic information systems
    • ๐Ÿค Build Trust: Provide evidence of systematic security planning to stakeholders

    This future threat model follows the Hack23 ISMS Threat Modeling Policy framework:

    • STRIDE Framework: Threat categorization per future system component
    • MITRE ATT&CK: Technique mapping for emerging attack vectors
    • ENISA Threat Landscape: EU-specific threat intelligence integration
    • OWASP LLM Top 10: AI/LLM-specific threat classification
    • CIA Triad: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability impact analysis
    Document Purpose
    THREAT_MODEL.md Current threat landscape (20 threats, v2.0)
    FUTURE_ARCHITECTURE.md Planned architectural evolution
    FUTURE_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md Planned security controls
    Hack23 ISMS - Threat Modeling Policy framework
    Hack23 ISMS - Secure Development Secure SDLC requirements
    Hack23 ISMS - Vulnerability Management Vulnerability lifecycle management

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    timeline
    title EU Parliament Monitor Architecture Evolution
    section Current (2026 H1)
    Static Site Generator : Node.js + EP MCP Server
    GitHub Pages : CDN-delivered static HTML
    14 Languages : Template-based generation
    section Phase 2 (2026 H2)
    AI Content Pipeline : LLM-enhanced news generation
    Confidence Scoring : Automated fact-checking
    Enhanced Monitoring : Real-time EP data validation
    section Phase 3 (2027)
    Real-Time Dashboard : Dynamic parliamentary analytics
    API Gateway : Public API for EP data access
    Community Features : User feedback and reporting
    section Phase 4 (2028+)
    Predictive Analytics : AI-powered political forecasting
    Multi-Parliament : Extended to national parliaments
    Federation : Decentralized transparency network
    flowchart LR
    subgraph "Current Attack Surface"
    direction TB
    C1[๐Ÿ“„ Static HTML] --- C2[๐Ÿ”Œ EP MCP Client]
    C2 --- C3[โš™๏ธ GitHub Actions]
    C3 --- C4[๐Ÿ“ฆ npm Dependencies]
    end

    subgraph "Phase 2 Attack Surface"
    direction TB
    P2_1[๐Ÿค– LLM Pipeline] --- P2_2[๐Ÿ“Š Confidence Scoring]
    P2_2 --- P2_3[๐Ÿ” Fact Checking]
    P2_3 --- P2_4[๐Ÿ“ก Enhanced Monitoring]
    end

    subgraph "Phase 3 Attack Surface"
    direction TB
    P3_1[๐ŸŒ API Gateway] --- P3_2[๐Ÿ‘ฅ User Accounts]
    P3_2 --- P3_3[๐Ÿ’ฌ Community Features]
    P3_3 --- P3_4[๐Ÿ“Š Real-Time Dashboard]
    end

    subgraph "Phase 4 Attack Surface"
    direction TB
    P4_1[๐ŸŒ Multi-Parliament] --- P4_2[๐Ÿ”— Federation Protocol]
    P4_2 --- P4_3[๐Ÿง  Predictive AI]
    P4_3 --- P4_4[๐Ÿ“ˆ Analytics Engine]
    end

    C4 -.->|"+8-12 threats"| P2_1
    P2_4 -.->|"+10-15 threats"| P3_1
    P3_4 -.->|"+5-8 threats"| P4_1

    style C1 fill:#e8f5e9
    style P2_1 fill:#fff4e1
    style P3_1 fill:#ffe1e1
    style P4_1 fill:#f3e5f5

    Asset Phase CIA Classification Protection Priority
    AI/LLM Models Phase 2 C:Low, I:Critical, A:High Model integrity, provenance verification
    API Keys & OAuth Tokens Phase 3 C:High, I:High, A:Medium Secret management, rotation policies
    User Account Data Phase 3 C:High (GDPR), I:High, A:Medium Privacy by design, encryption at rest
    Community Content Phase 3 C:Public, I:High, A:Medium Content integrity, moderation
    Federation Credentials Phase 4 C:Critical, I:Critical, A:High Mutual TLS, certificate management
    Predictive Models Phase 4 C:Medium, I:Critical, A:Medium Model integrity, bias prevention
    Cross-Parliament Data Phase 4 C:Low, I:Critical, A:High Data reconciliation, source verification
    Crown Jewel Threat Category Worst-Case Impact Protection Strategy
    Democratic Content Integrity Data Manipulation Public misinformation from trusted source Multi-layer validation, confidence scoring, human review
    User Privacy (GDPR) Data Breach Regulatory fines, reputation damage Privacy by design, data minimization, encryption
    AI Model Integrity Model Poisoning Systematically biased political content Model provenance, training data audit, bias detection
    Federation Trust Protocol Abuse Cross-platform trust compromise Mutual TLS, zero-trust architecture, audit logging

    Applies to: Phase 2 (AI Content Pipeline)

    Threat Description STRIDE MITRE ATT&CK Likelihood Impact Mitigation Strategy
    LLM Prompt Injection Adversarial EP data crafted to manipulate LLM output during news generation Tampering T1059 Medium High Input sanitization, prompt engineering guardrails, output validation
    LLM Hallucination AI generates plausible but incorrect parliamentary information Tampering N/A High High Confidence scoring, human-in-the-loop for <0.85 confidence, cross-reference validation
    Model Poisoning Training data manipulation to bias AI-generated content Tampering T1565 Low Critical Model provenance verification, training data audit, bias detection
    LLM Data Leakage AI model inadvertently exposing sensitive information in generated content Information Disclosure T1530 Low Medium Output filtering, PII detection, content review pipeline
    Adversarial Prompt via EP Data Crafted parliamentary text exploiting LLM instruction-following Tampering T1059.006 Medium High Input boundary enforcement, system prompt hardening
    Model Supply Chain Attack Compromised LLM model weights or framework dependency Tampering T1195 Low Critical Model checksums, signed artifacts, provenance verification

    OWASP LLM Top 10 Alignment:

    OWASP LLM ID Threat EU Parliament Monitor Relevance Planned Control
    LLM01 Prompt Injection EP data used as LLM input could contain injection vectors Input sanitization, prompt hardening
    LLM02 Insecure Output Handling Generated HTML could contain unsafe content from LLM Output validation, CSP, auto-escaping
    LLM04 Model Denial of Service Excessive EP data could overwhelm LLM processing Rate limiting, input size caps, timeout enforcement
    LLM05 Supply Chain Vulnerabilities LLM model or framework dependencies could be compromised Model provenance, dependency scanning
    LLM06 Sensitive Information Disclosure LLM might include sensitive patterns from training data Output filtering, content review
    LLM09 Overreliance Trusting LLM output without verification Confidence scoring, human review queue

    Applies to: Phase 3 (Real-Time Dashboard)

    Threat Description STRIDE MITRE ATT&CK Likelihood Impact Mitigation Strategy
    API Abuse Rate limiting bypass, credential stuffing on API endpoints Denial of Service T1110 Medium Medium OAuth2/API keys, rate limiting, WAF rules
    Server-Side Request Forgery API gateway exploited to access internal resources Elevation of Privilege T1190 Low High Strict allowlisting, network segmentation
    Real-Time Data Poisoning Malicious data injected into live dashboard feeds Tampering T1565 Low High Schema validation, anomaly detection, data signing
    Session Hijacking Authenticated user sessions compromised Spoofing T1539 Low Medium Secure session management, HTTPS-only, SameSite cookies
    GraphQL Injection Malicious queries exploiting GraphQL endpoint complexity Tampering T1190 Medium Medium Query depth limiting, complexity analysis, rate limiting
    WebSocket Hijacking Real-time data stream interception or manipulation Spoofing T1557 Low High WSS (TLS), origin validation, message authentication

    Applies to: Phase 3 (Community Features)

    Threat Description STRIDE MITRE ATT&CK Likelihood Impact Mitigation Strategy
    User-Generated Content Abuse Spam, disinformation, or political manipulation via feedback system Tampering T1491 High Medium Content moderation, anti-spam filters, reporting mechanism
    GDPR Data Breach User personal data exposure from community features Information Disclosure T1530 Low Critical Privacy by design, data minimization, encryption at rest
    Account Takeover Community user accounts compromised for manipulation Spoofing T1078 Medium Medium MFA, rate limiting, anomaly detection
    Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Bot networks manipulating community sentiment Repudiation T1583 Medium High Bot detection, behavioral analysis, rate limiting
    Cross-Site Scripting (Stored) User-submitted content containing XSS payloads Tampering T1189 Medium High Input sanitization, CSP, output encoding

    Applies to: Phase 4 (Multi-Parliament)

    Threat Description STRIDE MITRE ATT&CK Likelihood Impact Mitigation Strategy
    Cross-Parliament Data Integrity Inconsistent data between EU and national parliament sources Tampering T1565 Medium Medium Data reconciliation, source verification, integrity checksums
    Federation Protocol Abuse Exploiting inter-system communication for unauthorized data access Elevation of Privilege T1071 Low High Mutual TLS, API authentication, protocol validation
    Jurisdiction Conflict Different privacy laws (GDPR vs. national) creating compliance gaps N/A N/A Medium Medium Legal review per jurisdiction, data classification, consent management
    Supply Chain via Federation Partner Compromised national parliament data source injecting malicious data Tampering T1195.002 Low Critical Source validation, data integrity checks, anomaly detection
    DNS Hijacking of Federation Endpoints Redirecting federation traffic to attacker-controlled servers Spoofing T1584.002 Low High Certificate pinning, DNSSEC, mutual TLS

    Tactic Current Coverage Phase 2 (AI) Phase 3 (API) Phase 4 (Federation)
    Initial Access โœ… Supply chain, dependency ๐Ÿ”ฎ Model poisoning ๐Ÿ”ฎ API exploitation, credential stuffing ๐Ÿ”ฎ Federation endpoint abuse
    Execution โœ… GitHub Actions ๐Ÿ”ฎ Prompt injection, LLM manipulation ๐Ÿ”ฎ GraphQL injection ๐Ÿ”ฎ Cross-parliament code execution
    Persistence โœ… Repository compromise ๐Ÿ”ฎ Backdoored models ๐Ÿ”ฎ Account persistence, session fixation ๐Ÿ”ฎ Federation trust abuse
    Privilege Escalation โœ… Token scope abuse ๐Ÿ”ฎ Model authority escalation ๐Ÿ”ฎ OAuth scope escalation ๐Ÿ”ฎ Cross-jurisdiction privilege
    Defense Evasion โœ… SHA pinning bypass ๐Ÿ”ฎ Adversarial input evasion ๐Ÿ”ฎ WAF bypass ๐Ÿ”ฎ Cross-border evasion
    Credential Access โœ… Secret exposure ๐Ÿ”ฎ API key extraction from LLM ๐Ÿ”ฎ OAuth token theft ๐Ÿ”ฎ mTLS certificate theft
    Collection โœ… EP data access ๐Ÿ”ฎ Training data extraction ๐Ÿ”ฎ User data scraping ๐Ÿ”ฎ Cross-parliament data harvest
    Impact โœ… Content manipulation ๐Ÿ”ฎ Systematic bias injection ๐Ÿ”ฎ Service disruption, data manipulation ๐Ÿ”ฎ Democratic process manipulation
    graph TD
    ROOT[๐ŸŽฏ Compromise Democratic<br/>Content Integrity] --> AI[๐Ÿค– AI Pipeline Attack]
    ROOT --> API[๐ŸŒ API/Dashboard Attack]
    ROOT --> FED[๐ŸŒ Federation Attack]
    ROOT --> SOCIAL[๐Ÿ‘ฅ Social Engineering]

    AI --> AI1[Prompt Injection<br/>via EP Data]
    AI --> AI2[Model Poisoning<br/>via Training Data]
    AI --> AI3[Hallucination<br/>Exploitation]

    API --> API1[GraphQL<br/>Injection]
    API --> API2[Real-Time Data<br/>Poisoning]
    API --> API3[Session<br/>Hijacking]

    FED --> FED1[Federation<br/>Protocol Abuse]
    FED --> FED2[Compromised<br/>Partner Data]
    FED --> FED3[Jurisdiction<br/>Exploitation]

    SOCIAL --> SOC1[Coordinated<br/>Inauthentic Behavior]
    SOCIAL --> SOC2[Insider<br/>Threat]

    style ROOT fill:#ff6b6b,color:#fff
    style AI fill:#fff4e1
    style API fill:#e1f5ff
    style FED fill:#f3e5f5
    style SOCIAL fill:#ffe1e1

    Agent Type Current Risk Phase 2 Risk Phase 3 Risk Phase 4 Risk Evolution Driver
    ๐Ÿ›๏ธ Nation-State Actors Medium High High Critical AI manipulation tools, geopolitical interest in EU data
    ๐Ÿ’ฐ Cybercriminals Low Medium High High API monetization creates financial targets
    ๐ŸŽญ Hacktivists Medium Medium High High Community features enable social manipulation
    ๐Ÿ‘ค Malicious Insiders Low Medium Medium High Expanded team, federation partners
    ๐Ÿ”ง Accidental Insiders Medium High High High AI complexity increases error probability
    ๐Ÿค– AI-Powered Attackers Low High High Critical Automated adversarial content generation
    Capability 2026 (Current) 2027 (Phase 3) 2028+ (Phase 4)
    Adversarial ML Emerging Mainstream Advanced
    Automated Content Manipulation Basic Sophisticated AI-native
    Cross-Platform Attacks Limited Moderate Advanced (federation)
    Supply Chain Sophistication Known patterns AI model supply chain Federation supply chain
    Democratic Process Targeting Election periods Continuous influence Systemic manipulation

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    quadrantChart
    title ๐Ÿ”ฎ Future Threat Risk Assessment
    x-axis Low Likelihood --> High Likelihood
    y-axis Low Impact --> High Impact
    quadrant-1 Monitor & Prepare
    quadrant-2 Immediate Planning Required
    quadrant-3 Accept Risk
    quadrant-4 Design Controls Now

    "๐Ÿค– LLM Hallucination": [0.75, 0.70]
    "๐Ÿค– Prompt Injection": [0.55, 0.65]
    "๐Ÿค– Model Poisoning": [0.30, 0.85]
    "๐ŸŒ API Abuse": [0.60, 0.50]
    "๐ŸŒ SSRF": [0.35, 0.70]
    "๐Ÿ‘ฅ Content Abuse": [0.70, 0.45]
    "๐Ÿ‘ฅ GDPR Breach": [0.30, 0.80]
    "๐ŸŒ Data Integrity": [0.55, 0.55]
    "๐ŸŒ Federation Abuse": [0.30, 0.65]
    Threat ID Threat Likelihood (1-5) Impact (1-5) Risk Score Priority
    FT-001a LLM Prompt Injection 3 4 12 ๐Ÿ”ด High
    FT-001b LLM Hallucination 4 4 16 ๐Ÿ”ด Critical
    FT-001c Model Poisoning 2 5 10 ๐Ÿ”ด High
    FT-001d LLM Data Leakage 2 3 6 ๐ŸŸก Medium
    FT-001e Adversarial Prompt 3 4 12 ๐Ÿ”ด High
    FT-001f Model Supply Chain 2 5 10 ๐Ÿ”ด High
    FT-002a API Abuse 3 3 9 ๐ŸŸก Medium
    FT-002b SSRF 2 4 8 ๐ŸŸก Medium
    FT-002c Data Poisoning 2 4 8 ๐ŸŸก Medium
    FT-002d Session Hijacking 2 3 6 ๐ŸŸก Medium
    FT-003a Content Abuse 4 3 12 ๐Ÿ”ด High
    FT-003b GDPR Breach 2 5 10 ๐Ÿ”ด High
    FT-003c Account Takeover 3 3 9 ๐ŸŸก Medium
    FT-004a Cross-Parliament Integrity 3 3 9 ๐ŸŸก Medium
    FT-004b Federation Protocol Abuse 2 4 8 ๐ŸŸก Medium
    Phase New Attack Surface Threat Count Increase Key New Controls Required
    Current Static site + EP MCP 20 threats (baseline) Schema validation, CSP, SAST
    Phase 2 + AI/LLM pipeline +8-12 threats (LLM-specific) Confidence scoring, output validation, prompt hardening
    Phase 3 + API gateway, users +10-15 threats (API/user) WAF, OAuth2, rate limiting, session management
    Phase 4 + Multi-parliament federation +5-8 threats (federation) Mutual TLS, data reconciliation, jurisdiction management

    Scenario: A nation-state actor identifies that EU Parliament Monitor uses LLM-generated content. They craft adversarial European Parliament documents designed to trigger specific LLM outputs, injecting subtle political bias into generated news articles across all 14 languages.

    Attack Path:

    1. Attacker submits amendments to EP documents with adversarial text patterns
    2. EP MCP Server fetches legitimate EP data containing adversarial content
    3. LLM processes the data and generates subtly biased news articles
    4. Biased content published across 14 languages, amplifying disinformation

    Impact: Medium-High โ€” Undermines democratic transparency platform credibility

    Mitigation: Confidence scoring, cross-reference validation, multi-source fact-checking, human review queue for political content

    Scenario: A coordinated group creates fake user accounts to systematically upvote/downvote community assessments of MEP activities, creating artificial consensus around political positions.

    Attack Path:

    1. Attacker registers multiple accounts using disposable email services
    2. Bot network systematically rates/reviews MEP activities
    3. Artificial consensus distorts public perception via platform

    Impact: High โ€” Platform becomes tool for political manipulation rather than transparency

    Mitigation: Bot detection, behavioral analysis, rate limiting per account, proof-of-work for registration, anomaly detection on voting patterns

    What-If Scenario Probability Impact Response Strategy
    What if EP Open Data API introduces authentication? Medium High Implement OAuth2 client, update MCP server, credential rotation
    What if a major LLM provider has a security breach? Low Critical Model isolation, fallback to template-based generation, incident response
    What if EU AI Act mandates content labeling? High Medium Implement AI content disclosure, transparency watermarking
    What if a federation partner is compromised? Low High Mutual TLS revocation, data quarantine, partner isolation
    What if coordinated attack targets during EU elections? Medium Critical Election security protocols, enhanced monitoring, manual override

    Control Purpose Priority Timeline STRIDE Mitigation
    Confidence Scoring System Score 0.0-1.0 for each generated article; human review if <0.85 P1 Q3 2026 Tampering
    LLM Output Validation Automated fact-checking against official EP data sources P1 Q3 2026 Tampering
    Prompt Injection Detection Input sanitization for EP data before LLM processing P1 Q3 2026 Tampering
    Content Integrity Pipeline Cross-reference generated content with source EP data P2 Q4 2026 Tampering, Repudiation
    AI Bias Detection Automated political neutrality checking across 14 languages P2 Q4 2026 Tampering
    Model Provenance Verification Signed model artifacts, checksum validation P1 Q3 2026 Tampering
    Control Purpose Priority Timeline STRIDE Mitigation
    API Gateway with WAF Rate limiting, authentication, request validation P1 Q1 2027 DoS, Tampering
    OAuth2/OIDC Authentication Secure user authentication for community features P1 Q1 2027 Spoofing
    Content Moderation System Anti-spam, disinformation detection, reporting P1 Q2 2027 Tampering, Repudiation
    GDPR Compliance Layer Privacy by design, data minimization, consent management P1 Q1 2027 Information Disclosure
    Real-Time Anomaly Detection Monitor live data feeds for integrity violations P2 Q2 2027 Tampering
    GraphQL Query Complexity Limiting Prevent denial-of-service via complex queries P1 Q1 2027 DoS
    Control Purpose Priority Timeline STRIDE Mitigation
    Mutual TLS for Federation Secure inter-parliament communication P1 2028 Spoofing, Tampering
    Data Reconciliation Engine Cross-validate data between parliament sources P1 2028 Tampering
    Jurisdiction Compliance Engine Automated GDPR/national law compliance checking P2 2028 Information Disclosure
    Zero-Trust Federation Architecture Never trust, always verify partner data P1 2028 Spoofing, Elevation of Privilege
    Federation Audit Trail Immutable logging of all cross-parliament operations P1 2028 Repudiation

    Regulation Effective Date Impact on EP Monitor Required Controls
    EU AI Act 2026-2027 AI content generation transparency requirements AI content labeling, risk assessment, bias detection
    EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) 2027 Software security requirements for open-source SBOM, vulnerability disclosure, security updates
    NIS2 Directive Already effective Critical infrastructure security (if classified) Incident reporting, risk management, supply chain security
    GDPR Already effective User data protection for community features Privacy by design, DPO, DPIA, consent management
    EU Data Act 2025-2026 Data sharing and interoperability requirements Data portability, fair access, interoperability standards
    Control Phase 2 Relevance Phase 3 Relevance Phase 4 Relevance
    A.5.23 Cloud Security LLM API security API gateway cloud deployment Federation cloud architecture
    A.8.9 Configuration Management AI pipeline config API & user config Federation config management
    A.8.12 Data Leakage Prevention LLM output filtering User data protection Cross-border data controls
    A.8.25 Secure Development AI pipeline testing API security testing Federation protocol testing
    A.8.28 Secure Coding Prompt engineering API input validation Protocol implementation

    The following developments should trigger a threat model update:

    Indicator Trigger Action Review Priority
    New LLM vulnerability class discovered Update OWASP LLM Top 10 alignment ๐Ÿ”ด High
    EP API major version change Re-assess data integrity controls ๐Ÿ”ด High
    European Parliament election period Activate election security protocols ๐Ÿ”ด High
    New ENISA Threat Landscape published Update ENISA alignment section ๐ŸŸก Medium
    GitHub Actions security advisory Review CI/CD security controls ๐ŸŸก Medium
    New EU regulation (AI Act, CRA update) Update compliance mapping ๐ŸŸก Medium
    National parliament data source added Expand threat model scope ๐ŸŸก Medium
    Major LLM provider breach or incident Review AI pipeline security controls ๐Ÿ”ด High
    Federation partner security incident Activate partner isolation protocols ๐Ÿ”ด High
    Assessment Type Frequency Trigger Scope
    Quarterly Review Every 3 months Scheduled Full threat landscape review
    Phase Transition Assessment Per architecture phase Phase completion New attack surface analysis
    Incident-Driven Assessment As needed Security incident Affected threat categories
    Regulatory Update Assessment As needed New regulation Compliance impact analysis
    ENISA-Triggered Review Annually ENISA report publication EU threat landscape alignment

    Level Phase Capabilities Evidence
    ๐ŸŸข Level 2: Repeatable Current Structured STRIDE analysis, MITRE ATT&CK mapping THREAT_MODEL.md v2.0
    ๐ŸŸก Level 3: Defined Phase 2 AI-specific threat modeling, automated threat detection OWASP LLM integration, CI/CD security gates
    ๐ŸŸ  Level 4: Managed Phase 3 Quantitative risk assessment, threat intelligence feeds Real-time monitoring, SIEM integration
    ๐Ÿ”ด Level 5: Optimized Phase 4 Predictive threat analysis, automated response AI-driven threat detection, self-healing controls

    Document Description Link
    THREAT_MODEL.md Current threat landscape (20 threats) THREAT_MODEL.md
    SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md Current security controls SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md
    FUTURE_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md Planned security enhancements FUTURE_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE.md
    FUTURE_ARCHITECTURE.md Planned architectural evolution FUTURE_ARCHITECTURE.md
    Hack23 ISMS - Threat Modeling Policy framework Threat_Modeling.md
    Hack23 ISMS - Secure Development Secure SDLC requirements Secure_Development_Policy.md
    Hack23 ISMS - Vulnerability Management Vulnerability lifecycle Vulnerability_Management.md
    Hack23 ISMS - Classification Data classification framework CLASSIFICATION.md

    Role Name Date Signature
    Security Architect Security Team 2026-03-19 Approved
    Product Owner Product Team 2026-03-19 Approved
    CEO / CISO CEO 2026-03-19 Approved
    Version Date Author Changes
    1.0 2026-02-26 Security Team Initial future threat model document
    - AI/LLM threat analysis (OWASP LLM Top 10 alignment)
    - API gateway and dynamic content threats
    - Community feature threat analysis
    - Multi-parliament federation threats
    - Planned security controls roadmap (Phase 2-4)
    - Emerging threat indicator monitoring plan
    2.0 2026-03-19 Security Team Major expansion per ISMS Threat Modeling Policy
    - Added architecture documentation map
    - Added STRIDE categorization to all threats
    - Added MITRE ATT&CK future coverage analysis
    - Added future attack trees with Mermaid diagrams
    - Added threat agent evolution analysis
    - Added quantitative risk scoring
    - Added scenario-centric analysis (misuse cases)
    - Added what-if analysis
    - Added future compliance framework mapping
    - Added crown jewel analysis for future state
    - Added threat modeling maturity progression
    - Added attack surface evolution diagram

    ๐Ÿ“‹ Document Control:
    โœ… Approved by: James Pether Sรถrling, CEO - Hack23 AB
    ๐Ÿ“ค Distribution: Public
    ๐Ÿท๏ธ Classification: Confidentiality: Public Integrity: Medium Availability: Medium


    This future threat model anticipates the evolving threat landscape for the EU Parliament Monitor as it advances from a static site generator to a comprehensive European Parliament intelligence platform. It demonstrates Hack23 AB's commitment to proactive security through forward-looking threat analysis aligned with the Hack23 ISMS Threat Modeling Policy.